

Appendix 1: Sources on Jin construction of frontier walls, trenches, and forts

(Lotze, Xia, Zhang, and Shelach-Lavi 2026, “To Build Or Not To Build?”)

In this appendix we present, as interlinear translations, the key primary sources commenting on the building of Jin fortifications, together with crucial passages from travel reports, arranged diachronically and systematically. “Tpq” is short for *terminus post quem*, and “taq” for *terminus ante quem*. If a year is written as “1165,” it is explicitly given in the sources. Where the sources are ambiguous, “circa” is added.

I) Pre-Shizong era of the Jin (1115–1160):

1. 1121 tpq (1138 taq): Frontier trenches dug in Taizhou under military governor Poluhuo

II) Shizong era (1161–1189):

2. 1160s: Yila Anda relocates forts from inner to outer territories
3. 1165: Edict orders that seventy forts be built across Taizhou and Linhuang
4. 1165 circa: Li Shi and Heshilie Liangbi argue against trench-building
5. 1170 circa: Wanyan Zongxu and Heshilie Liangbi disagree over trench politics
6. 1177: Heshilie Liangbi and Emperor Shizong clash on the issue of military farming
7. 1181: Pucha Zhangjianu inspects forts, Xi Hushihai suggests to build 250 additional ones

III) Zhangzong era (1189–1208):

8. 1190 tpq (1196 taq): Civilians suffer due to construction of trenches against armies
9. 1191: Li Yu submits a proposal concerning *tuntian* and fortified frontier garrisons
10. 1192: Dang Huaiying and sixteen other officials oppose trench-building
11. 1193: Dong Shizhong draws attention to various pressures facing civilians
12. 1196: Frontier trenches built to prevent the return of hostile groups led by Yelü Deshou
13. 1196 circa: Xia memorandum criticizes Jin for trenches encroaching into Xia lands
14. 1197: Wanyan Anguo in charge of fort-building shortly before Duji Sizhong
15. 1198: Soldiers under Duji Sizhong expand earlier Shizong-era garrisons
16. 1198: Wanyan Xiang makes soldiers and civilians dig moats
17. 1199 circa: Pusan Kui’s trenches form a continuous line with beacon towers
18. 1200: A great amount of frontier wall construction is being performed
19. 1202 circa: Wanyan Zonghao argues for trench-building, against Zhang Wangong

IV) Late Jin sources (1209–1234):

20. 1210–1211: Building and re-building of Black Desert Fort (Wushabao)
21. 1211: Duji Sizhong and Wanyan Chengyu reinforce Black Desert Fort
22. 1211: Mongols capture Black Desert Fort; importance of local geographical knowledge
23. 1221: Li Zhichang observes Jin-era border fortifications north of Fuzhou
24. 1221: Zhao Gong reflects on emperor Zhangzong’s “new long-wall”

V) Sources of the first three decades following the Jin’s fall (1235–1265):

25. 1247: Zhang Dehui observes Jin-era trenches north of Changzhou
26. 1261: Wang Yun observes trenches north of Huanzhou

I) Pre-Shizong era of the Jin (1115–1160)

Source 1

Frontier trenches dug in Taizhou under military governor Wanyan Poluhuo¹

Dated: 1121 terminus post quem (1138 terminus ante quem)

Note: Although the construction of border fortifications peaked under Shizong and Zhangzong, the first trenches were dug earlier. The passage below is not dated, but since Wanyan Poluhuo's relevant time of political activity falls into the period 1121–1138 (Campaign Commander of Taizhou in charge of the Northeast circuit), the trenches must have been built during these years.

金之壤地封疆: ... 右旋入泰州婆盧火所浚界壕，而西經臨潢、金山，跨慶、桓、撫、昌、淨州之北，出天山外，包東勝，接西夏。

The lands and borders of the Jin: ... Turning right [i.e., south?], one enters the [area of] frontier trenches (*jiehao*) dug by [Wanyan] Poluhuo (d. 1138) in Taizhou. Westwards, [the border] passes through Linhuang and Jinshan [Khangai Range], extending across the north of Qingzhou, Huanzhou, Fuzhou, Changzhou, and Jingzhou. It runs beyond Tianshan [Yin Mountains], includes Dongsheng (the seat of present-day Ordos City, Inner Mongolia), and adjoins the [Tangut] Xixia [lands].

II) Shizong era (1161–1189)

Source 2

Yila Anda relocates forts from inner to outer territories²

Dated: 1160s

入爲兵部侍郎，徙西北、西南兩路舊設堡戍迫近內地者于極邊安置，仍與泰州、臨潢邊堡相接。After entering the capital and becoming Vice Minister of War, [Yila Anda] moved the forts that had previously been built close to the inner lands (*neidi*) of the Northwest and Southwest circuits to locations along the outermost borders (*jibian*), integrating them with existing border forts of Taizhou and Linhuang.

Source 3

Edict orders that seventy forts be built across Taizhou and Linhuang³

Dated: 1165

Note: It seems that this construction plan was never fully implemented.

詔泰州、臨潢接境設邊堡七十，駐兵萬三千。

An imperial edict ordered that seventy frontier forts (*bianbao*) extending across Taizhou and Linhuang be built and 13,000 soldiers be stationed there.

¹ JS, 24.549; *Dili zhi* 地理志 (Treatise on administrative geography). While this excerpt is from a geographical treatise, most other passages in this appendix were drawn from the biographies of officials. In the footnotes for this appendix, we highlight the exact provenance of each JS passage to stress the key role played by biographies.

² JS, 91.2023; *Yila Anda zhuan* 移剌按答傳 (Biography of Yila Anda).

³ JS 6.135; *Shizong benji* 世宗本紀 (Basic annals of Emperor Shizong).

Source 4

Li Shi and Heshilie Liangbi argue against trench-building⁴

Dated: 1165 circa

Note: Grand Councilor Heshilie Liangbi 紇石烈良弼 (1119–1178) and Li Shi 李石 (d. 1176, Censor-in-chief and Director of the Department of State Affairs) opposed the construction of trenches and walls on several occasions on the grounds that the trenches were not efficient.

北鄙歲警，朝廷欲發民穿深塹以禦之。

Alarms were raised in the northern frontier towns (*bi*) every year. [Therefore,] the court wished to mobilize civilians (*min*) to dig deep trenches (*qian*) to defend [these towns].⁵

石與丞相紇石烈良弼皆曰：「不可。北俗無定居，出沒不常，惟當以德柔之；若徒深塹，必當置戍，而塞北多風沙，曾未期年，塹已平矣，不可疲中國有用之力，為此無益。」

Both [Li] Shi and Grand Councilor Heshilie Liangbi said: “No. The northerners do not settle down, appearing and disappearing irregularly. We should use virtue (*de*) to calm (*rou*) them.⁶ Once we [dig] deep trenches, we also need to deploy garrisons (*shu*). Because of frequent sandstorms north of the passes (*saipei*), the trenches will be leveled in less than one year. It is not advisable to squander the resources of the Central Realm in this useless project.”

議遂寢。

The proposal then fell into silence.

Source 5

Wanyan Zongxu and Heshilie Liangbi disagree over trench politics⁷

Dated: 1170 circa

Note: This is a short extract from Heshilie Liangbi's JS biography which also elaborates on the origins of his career in the new Jurchen-language institutions. Under Taizong (1123–1135), he was chosen to become a student of the Jurchen script in the capital. Later, he served as Jurchen-script instructor and became a clerk at the Department of State Affairs (*Shangshu sheng*).

參知政事宗敘請置沿邊壕塹，良弼曰：「敵國果來伐，此豈可禦哉？」

Vice Grand Councilor [Wanyan] Zongxu (1126–1171) requested that trenches (*haoqian*) be built along the frontier. [Heshilie] Liangbi said: “If enemy states (*digu*) should attack us, how can this [a mere trench] possibly repel them?”

⁴ JS, 86.1915; *Li Shi zhuan* 李石傳 (Biography of Li Shi).

⁵ This construction scheme may belong to the same context as the 1165 edict ordering that seventy forts be built across Taizhou and Linhuang (see source 3 above).

⁶ Or something to the effect of “we should pacify them with kindness.” *De* 德 (virtue, merit, kindness, ‘moral power,’ ‘gracious treatment’) is a complex term, but certainly Heshilie Liangbi and Li Shi's main point here is that *some* kind of non-military solution to the nomad ‘problem’ should be pursued.

⁷ JS, 88.1952; *Heshilie Liangbi zhuan* 紇石烈良弼傳 (Biography of Heshilie Liangbi).

Source 6

Heshilie Liangbi and the Shizong emperor clash on the issue of military farming⁸

Dated: 1177 (Dading 17)

Note: This is a detailed discussion of forced relocations that also addresses the issues of frontier agriculture, rotating garrison troops, and more permanent settlements. As argued above, these questions of frontier agriculture and garrison troops were probably raised as a result of the relocation of large populations of nomadic (and formerly border-guarding) Kitans.

西南、西北招討司契丹餘黨心素狠戾，復恐生事，它時或有邊隙，不為我用，令遷之于烏古里石壘部及上京之地。

[The emperor said:]⁹ Given that the remaining Kitans¹⁰ in the Southwest and Northwest [circuits] are vicious and hard-hearted in nature, I worry that they may create trouble. If frontier conflicts (*bianxi*) should arise some day, they might not side with us. I order to relocate (*qian*) them to the lands of the [Jurchen] Wuguli and Shilei tribes (the region around the middle course of the Nen River 嫩江 between today's Inner Mongolia and Jilin provinces) and to the Upper Capital (present-day Acheng 阿城, near Harbin, Heilongjiang province).¹¹

上謂宰臣曰：「北邊番戍之人，歲冒寒暑，往來千里，甚為勞苦。」

The emperor [Shizong] addressed his officials and said: “The garrison troops in the northern frontier (*beibian*) who take turns in performing their duties¹² put up with rough conditions (lit. “cold and heat”) every year. They travel back and forth a thousand *li* and [endure] extremely hard work.

縱有一二馬牛，一往則無還理，且奪其農時不得耕種。

Even if [each soldier] possesses one or two horses and oxen, once he goes [to the frontier] there is no reason for him to return. Moreover, he will miss the agricultural season and cannot cultivate (lit. “plough and sow”) his ground.

故嘗命卿等議，以何術得罷其役，使安於田裏，不知卿議何如也？」

Thus, I once ordered you to discuss the matter: how can they be exempted from the forced labor service (*yi*) and be enabled to settle down next to their fields? I am wondering what proposals you will present?”

左丞相良弼對曰：「北邊之地，不堪耕種，不能長戍，故須番戍耳。」

[Heshilie] Liangbi, the Left Grand Councilor, responded: “The soil around the northern frontier is not suitable for cultivation. Therefore, the garrison troops cannot permanently be stationed there. Instead, they need to rotate.”

⁸ JS, 44.994; *Bingzhi* 兵志 (Treatise on the military).

⁹ This paragraph might either be ‘verbatim’ imperial speech or a paraphrase of it; we assume the former.

¹⁰ During the Jurchen attacks against the Liao in the early twelfth century, a number of Kitans fled westwards and established the Qara Khitai. Most Kitans, however, remained and became subjects of the Jin. The term “remaining Kitans” (*Qidan yudang* 契丹餘黨) here might refer broadly to those who stayed in North China in 1124 or, more likely, specifically to those who survived the great Kitan insurgency and its suppression in 1163.

¹¹ As argued, the historical background (or pretext) to these forced relocations was the defection of several Kitan military leaders to the Qara Khitai state in Central Asia that had happened earlier in 1177.

¹² *Fanshu* 番戍 expresses something like “the alternating garrison troops,” “the garrison troops who take turns.”

上曰：「朕一日萬幾，安能遍及，卿等既為宰相，以此急務反以為末事，竟無一言，甚勞朕慮。」

The emperor said: “Each day I have to attend to ten thousand affairs. How can I reach everything? You grand councilors neglect urgent issues and do not attend to them. I am greatly concerned by this. You have no proposal whatsoever, I need to do all the thinking by myself!

往者參政宗敘屢為朕言，若以貧戶永屯邊境，使之耕種，官給糧廩，則貧者得濟，富戶免於更代之勞，使之得勤農務。

Earlier, [Wanyan] Zongxu, the Vice Grand Councilor, told me repeatedly that if poor households (*pinhu*) are permanently relocated to the frontier, this will enable them to cultivate the land (*gengzhong*). If officials supply them with provisions from the government granary, the poor will be lifted out of poverty (lit. “will cross the river”). [That way,] the rich households (*fuhu*) will be spared this labor of rotation and may devote themselves to [regular] agricultural work (*nongwu*).

若宗敘者可謂盡心為國矣！朕嘗思之，宜以兩路招討司及烏古里石壘部族、臨潢府、泰州等路分定保戍，具數以聞，朕親覽焉。」

Someone like Zongxu may truly be called a faithful servant of the dynasty! I have thought it over: [we must] divide clearly between garrisons [in terms of administration] and report precise numbers¹³ for the Pacification Commissions of the two circuits [i.e. the Southwest and Northwest circuits mentioned in the beginning], for the Wuguli and Shilei tribes, and for the Linhuang and Taizhou circuits. I will personally look at [this issue].”

十八年，命部族、紉分番守邊。

In the eighteenth year (1178), [the imperial court] commanded the tribes (*buzu*) and mixed (*jiu*)¹⁴ army units to take turns in guarding the frontier.¹⁵

Source 7

Pucha Zhangjianu inspects forts, Xi Hushihai suggests to build 250 additional ones¹⁶

Dated: 1181 (Dading 21, third month 大定二十一年三月)

邊堡，大定二十一年三月，世宗以東北路招討司十九堡在泰州之境，及臨潢路舊設二十四堡障參差不齊，遣大理司直蒲察張家奴等往視其處置。

Regarding frontier forts (*bianbao*): in the third month of the twenty-first year of Dading (1181), because the nineteen forts (*bao*) at the Taizhou border [under jurisdiction of the] Northeast circuit Pacification Commissions as well as the twenty-four guard posts (*baozhang*) previously set up in Linhuang circuit were not aligned regularly, Shizong dispatched the Judiciary at the Court of Judicial Review Pucha Zhangjianu and others to go to the locations where [forts] had been erected.

¹³ “Precise numbers” presumably refers to numbers of soldiers at each garrison (or numbers of households), etc.

¹⁴ As elaborated above, the *jiu* army consisted of a wide array of ethnicities (including Kitans, Jurchens, Tatars, Tanguts, and Önggüt). Living along and beyond the Jin frontier, they served the Jin as border patrol troops.

¹⁵ It may seem odd that Zongxu’s proposal was apparently not realized—the last sentence again speaks of taking turns (what was to be avoided). See the main text for a discussion of ambiguity in this passage.

¹⁶ JS, 24.564; *Dili zhi*.

於是東北自達里帶石堡子至鶴五河地分，臨潢路自鶴五河堡子至撒里乃，皆取直列置堡戍。

Thus, in the Northeast circuit from Dalidaishi baozi ‘Fort Dalidaishi’ to Hewuhe ‘Five Crane River,’ and in Linhuang circuit from Hewuhe baozi ‘Fort Five Crane River’ to Salinai, garrison forts (*baoshu*) were all set up in a straight line.

評事移刺敏言：「東北及臨潢所置，土瘠樵絕，當令所徙之民姑逐水草以居，分遣丁壯營畢，開壕塹以備邊。」

Case Reviewer Yila Min said: “[As for structures that] have been set up in the Northeast and Linhuang circuits: The soil is thin and there is no firewood. We should order those civilians (*min*) who will be transferred there to temporarily migrate to locations [with access to] water and grass. [We must] dispatch healthy and strong men to complete construction of the camps (*ying*): they will dredge trenches to guard the frontier.”

上令無水草地官為建屋，及臨潢路諸堡皆以放良人戍守。省議：「臨潢路二十四堡，堡置戶三十，共為七百二十，若營建畢，官給一歲之食。」上以年飢權寢，姑令開壕為備。

The emperor ordered that the government build houses in those places without water and grass and that ‘good commoners’ (*liangren*, i.e. non-criminals) be sent to all forts (*bao*) in Linhuang circuit to guard them. The Department of State Affairs commented: “[Since] Linhuang circuit has twenty-four forts, and [since each] is comprised of thirty households, there are altogether 720 [households]. Once construction is finished, officials will provide food for one year.” Because there was a famine that year, the proposal was temporarily called off and an imperial edict ordered to dig trenches for defense as a provisional measure.¹⁷

四月，遣吏部郎中奚胡失海經畫壕塹，旋為沙雪堙塞，不足為禦。

In the fourth month (of 1181), Xi Hushihai, Director (*langzhong*) of the Ministry of Personnel, was dispatched to take care of the trenches (*haoqian*). Soon after that, sand and snow covered up the strategic strongholds (*sai*), making them inadequate for defense [purposes].

乃言：「可築二百五十堡，堡日用工三百，計一月可畢，糧亦足備，可為邊防久計。」

[Xi Hushihai] then said: “We can construct 250 forts (*bao*). With 300 laborers constructing one fort, it will take one month to complete it. Sufficient food provisions will be provided [until construction is finished]. [This construction] will have long-term [benefits] for frontier defense.¹⁸

泰州九堡、臨潢五堡之地斥鹵，官可為屋外，自撒里乃以西十九堡，舊戍軍舍少，可令大鹽澤官木三萬餘¹⁹，與直東堡近嶺求木，每家官為構室一椽以處之。」

Nine[teen]²⁰ forts in Taizhou and five forts in Linhuang are located next to saline marches. Officials can build their houses (*wu*). In addition, there are nineteen forts west of Salinai. Previously the garrisons had few houses (*she*). Officials [in charge of] Dayanluo lake (“Great Lake of Salt,” in East Ujimqin banner, Inner Mongolia) should be ordered to search for over 30,000 trees in the mountains close to the fort that is directly to the east.²¹ The government will construct one room (*shi*) for each household to live in.”

¹⁷ This seems to imply that forts were seen as a comprehensive system of defense, while trenches were provisional.

¹⁸ As Wang Guowei (“Jin jiehao kao,” 716) pointed out, however, this plan was apparently never fully carried out.

¹⁹ The JS text may be corrupted here; see discussion in the main text.

²⁰ 九 here might be a typo for 十九. If so, this passage would be in accordance with the “nineteen forts at the Taizhou border” 十九堡在泰州之境 mentioned at the beginning of this source.

²¹ It is not clear what “to the east” is in reference to; perhaps east of the Dayanluo lake.

III) Zhangzong era (1189–1208):

Source 8

Civilians suffer due to construction of trenches against armies²²

Dated: 1190 terminus post quem (1196 terminus ante quem)

Note: The Mingchang reign (1190–1196) is intimately associated with wall-building. NB that this passage is taken from the JS biography of Zhang Wangong 張萬公 (1134–1207), an opponent of fortifications. The same event might have been narrated differently in another person's biography.

初明昌間，有司建議，自西南、西北路，沿臨潢達泰州，開筑壕塹以備大兵。役者三萬人，連年未就。

In the Mingchang years, officials proposed to construct trenches (*haoqian*) to guard against large armies. [The trenches should run] from the Southwest and Northwest circuits, along Linhuang, and all the way to Taizhou. Thirty thousand corvée laborers (*yizhe*) worked for years [but] did not accomplish [this project].

御史臺言：「所開旋為風沙所平，無益於禦侮，而徒勞民。」

The Censorate said: “Whatever is dug is immediately leveled by sandstorms (*fengsha*). It does not help the resistance against foreign aggression (*yuwu*) but simply exhausts the civilians (*min*) in vain.”

上因旱災，問萬公所由致。萬公對以「勞民之久，恐傷和氣，宜從御史臺所言，罷之為便」。Emperor [Zhangzong] asked [Zhang] Wangong about the reason behind a drought. Wangong replied: “As the civilians have endured strenuous labor for a long time, this may destroy the harmony. What the Censorate said should be followed. This is a good moment to stop it [i.e., construction projects].”

後丞相襄師還，卒為開築，民甚苦之。

Later, when the army of Grand Councilor [Wanyan] Xiang returned, the construction was finally accomplished.²³ The civilians suffered severely from it.

Source 9

Li Yu submits a proposal concerning *tuntian* and fortified frontier garrisons²⁴

Dated: 1191

Note: After hosting a banquet for the northern tribes and returning to the capital, Li Yu submitted this proposal to emperor Zhangzong.

擬自臨潢至西夏沿邊創設重鎮十數，仍選猛安謀克勳臣子孫有材力者使居其職，田給于軍者許募漢人佃種，不必遠挽牛頭粟而兵自富強矣。

The plan is as follows: establish a dozen heavily fortified garrisons along the frontier from Linhuang to Western Xia; appoint capable and robust descendants of distinguished *meng'an-mouke* leaders to command them; allocate land to these military units and permit them to recruit Han people to cultivate it. In doing so, there will be no need to transport ox-head grain (i.e., the tax collected from *meng'an-mouke* households) over long distances, while the troops themselves will grow prosperous and strong.

²² JS, 95.2103–04; *Zhang Wangong zhuan* 張萬公傳 (Biography of Zhang Wangong)..

²³ The word “later” (*hou* 後) seems to refer to Wanyan Xiang's construction project of 1198 (see source 15).

²⁴ JS, 96.2129.

Source 10

Dang Huaiying and sixteen other officials oppose trench-building²⁵

Dated: 1192

Note: Apart from Zhang Wangong, at least two more Chinese officials, Dang Huaiying 党懷英 (1134–1211) and Dong Shizhong 董師中 (1129–1202), took part in Zhangzong's court debates.

議開邊防濠塹，懷英等十六人請罷其役，詔從之。

[In a court debate] it was discussed to dig trenches (*haoqian*) for frontier defense (*bianfang*). Dang Huaiying and sixteen other individuals requested that this corvée labor task (*yi*) be stopped. An imperial edict was issued to implement [their request].

Source 11

Dong Shizhong draws attention to various pressures facing civilians²⁶

Dated: 1193

Note: Here trench-construction appears in a general list of corvée labor tasks. The wider context of this quote is an address Dong Shizhong gave at court, arguing against seasonal hunting around a hunting palace known as Jingming gong 景明宮, itself located within the Jinlian chuan hunting grounds (see map 2). The civilians in question here are those that live in or around Jinlian chuan.

加以民有養馬簽軍挑壕之役，財力大困，流移未復，米價甚貴。

In addition, civilians (*min*) have been burdened by the corvée labor tasks (*yi*) of raising horses, being ready to join the army, and digging trenches (*tiao hao*). They are in great financial strains. Due to the high price of grain, [some of them] are roaming around and have not returned home yet.

Source 12

Frontier trenches built to prevent the return of hostile groups led by Yelü Deshou²⁷

Dated: actually 1196 (year of the Yelü Deshou rebellion) but misdated by this source to 1201

Note: While this source might rather describe what Zhangzong hoped to achieve than the actual material condition of the trenches, the motives for trench-building alluded to here are plausible.

是年有羣牧使耶律得壽叛，聚兵數萬，以毛尾為大帥。

In this year, the Commissioner of Herds (*qunmushi*) Yelü Deshou rebelled (*pan*). He gathered tens of thousands of soldiers and made Maowei commanding general (*dashuai*).

²⁵ JS, 125.2727; *Dang Huaiying zhuan* 党懷英傳 (Biography of Dang Huaiying).

²⁶ JS, 95.2114; *Dong Shizhong zhuan* 董師中傳 (Biography of Dong Shizhong).

²⁷ DJGZ, 20.278. In contrast to the JS, usually seen as relatively reliable, the credibility of the DJGZ is more contested: some call it a valid “supplement to the *Jinshi*” (Schneider, “The Jin Revisited,” 347), while Liu Pujiang discards it as a pseudo-history. As noted, it is attributed to Yuwen Maozhao, a Jin official who changed loyalty and went over to the Song. According to some sources, he presented this work to the Song court in 1234, the Jin's final year. See Liu Pujiang, “Zai lun *Da Jinguo zhi* de zhenwei—jian ping *Da Jinguo zhi jiaozheng*” 再論《大金國志》的真偽——兼評《〈大金國志〉校證》，in *Liao Jin shi lun* 遼金史論 (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 1999), 335–56. While the exact date of compilation is uncertain, it is assumed that the DJGZ was indeed created in the mid-thirteenth century and thus roughly one full century earlier than the JS. See Hok-lam Chan, *Legitimation in Imperial China: Discussions under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1984), 79.

主拜十一騎為元帥馬，紇石烈善樂為招討使，將兵三十萬以擊之，誅得壽、毛尾，遂追其餘衆至草地，凡六十日而歸。

The ruler (i.e., the Jin emperor) appointed eleven horses as the Marshal's mounts, and Heshilie Shanle [i.e., the "Marshal"] as Pacification Commissioner.²⁸ [Together they] led an army of 300,000 troops to attack them [the insurgents]. They put Deshou and Maowei to death, chased the remaining [enemies] into the steppe (*caodi*), and returned after sixty days.

冬，浚界壕，深廣各三丈，東接高麗，西達夏境，列屯戍兵數千里，防其復至。

In the winter, frontier trenches (*jiehao*) were dug, measuring three *zhang* in depth and three *zhang* in width. [The trenches] touched Korea (Gaoli) in the east, reached the [Tangut] Xia territories in the west. Troops were stationed across several thousand *li* to prevent the return [of the armed insurgents].

Source 13

Xia memorandum criticizes Jin for trenches encroaching into Xia lands²⁹

Dated: 1196 circa (as the Yelü Deshou rebellion of 1196 is again mentioned)

十一月，金人浚濠入界，詰之，不報。

In the eleventh month, the Jin dug a trench (*jun hao*) into [Tangut Xia] territories. [Emperor Huanzong 桓宗 of Xixia, r. 1193–1206] scolded it. [The Jin]³⁰ did not present an explanation.³¹

金群牧使耶律德壽叛，金主遣將斬之。

When Yelü Deshou, the Jin's Commissioner for Animal Husbandry, rebelled, the Jin ruler sent a general to behead him [to execute him, thereby crushing the rebellion].

恐其餘黨復擾，集民夫浚邊界濠塹，東自高麗，西連夏境，列屯數千里。

[Due to] concerns that the remaining elements of the [rebel] association might once again create disturbances, [the Jin] gathered civilians (*min*) to dig frontier trenches and moats. [These trenches and moats] were manned with garrison troops (*tun*) and [extended] several thousands *li* from Goryeo (Gaoli, Korea) in the East to the [Tangut] Xia territories in the West.

純佑怒其入界，遣使詰之。金人不報。

Chunyou [i.e. Emperor Huanzong of Xixia] was enraged by [the Jin trench] entering his territories, and sent envoys to scold them [the Jin people]. The Jin people did not present an explanation.

²⁸ Heshilie Shanle and "the Marshal" are, apparently, the same person.

²⁹ Wu Guangcheng 吳廣成, *Xixia shushi* 西夏書事 (Recorded affairs of the Western Xia, 1825), *juan* 39, cited after *Xixia shushi jiaozheng* 西夏書事校証, ed. Gong Shijun 龔世俊 (Lanzhou: Gansu wenhua chubanshe, 1995), 460. The provenance of this passage is not entirely clear and it has to be treated with caution. It is supposedly a Xia memorandum transmitted through DJGZ and is found in the *Xixia shushi* compilation by the Qing historian Wu Guangcheng. As modern editor Gong Shijun has shown, the precise sources of the *Xixia shushi* are often unclear.

³⁰ Must be inferred from context: at the end of this passage we read 金人不報, clarifying the grammatical subject.

³¹ Much in this translation is based on inference and context. E.g., perhaps 不報 could also mean "did not announce [their trench-digging plans] in advance." Was the trench already there and just deepened? Or built *ex nihilo*?

Source 14

Wanyan Anguo in charge of fort-building shortly before Duji Sizhong³²

Dated: 1197 (承安三年)

承安二年，以營邊堡功，召簽樞密院事。

In the second year of [emperor Zhangzong's] Cheng'an reign period (1197): Due to his achievements (*gong*) in the construction of frontier forts (*bianbao*), [Wanyan Anguo 完顏安國 (n.d.)] was promoted to a position in the Bureau of Military Affairs.

Source 15

Soldiers under Duji Sizhong expand earlier Shizong-era garrisons³³

Dated: 1198 (承安三年)

Note: This is the complete initial part of Duji Sizhong's (fl. 1195–1211) JS biography which starts in the year 1195 and immediately focuses on a dated trench-building event of 1198.

獨吉思忠本名千家奴。明昌六年，為行省都事，累遷同簽樞密院事。

The original [given] name of Duji Sizhong was Qianjianu.³⁴ In the sixth year of [Zhangzong's] Mingchang reign period (1195), he became Office Manager in the Branch Secretariat. Later he rose through the ranks to a post equivalent to Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs.

承安三年，除興平軍節度使，改西北路招討使。

In the third year of [Zhangzong's] Cheng'an reign (1198), he was appointed to the position of Military Commissioner (*jiedushi*) of Xingpingjun Prefecture. Then he moved to the post of Northwest circuit Pacification Commissioner.³⁵

初，大定間，修築西北屯戍，西自坦舌，東至胡烈么，幾六百里。

Previously, in the Dading era (i.e. emperor Shizong's reign, 1161–1189), garrisons (*tunshu*) were built in the Northwest circuit. [They extended] for around 600 *li* [300 km] from Tanshe in the west to Hulieme in the east.³⁶

中間堡障，工役促迫，雖有牆隍，無女牆副堤。

Construction of the guard posts (*baozhang*) along the line was done in a great hurry (*cu po*): although there were walls (*qiang*) and moats (*huang*), [the structure] lacked battlements (*nüqiang*) and a secondary line of embankment (*fudi*).³⁷

³² JS, 94.2094; *Wanyan Anguo zhuan* 完顏安國傳 (Biography of Wanyan Anguo).

³³ JS, 93.2063–64; *Duji Sizhong zhuan* 獨吉思忠傳 (Biography of Duji Sizhong).

³⁴ The family name of this Jurchen individual is Duji 獨吉. This line suggests that his given name at birth (Qianjianu 千家奴, presumably his Jurchen name) was later changed to Sizhong 思忠 (lit. “Pondering Loyalty”).

³⁵ In this short summary of Duji Sizhong's career 1195–1198, the position as Northwest circuit Pacification Commissioner is the important one for our purposes, as it gives him responsibility in matters of border fortifications.

³⁶ This paragraph and the next one might seem chronologically out of context at first glance: they provide the background information (Shizong era) to Duji Sizhong's 'heroic' trench-building acts in the Zhangzong era.

³⁷ Here the early-Shizong-era background story (1161 et seq.) ends and we jump back to the year 1198.

思忠增繕，用工七十五萬，止用屯戍軍卒，役不及民，上嘉其勞，賜詔獎諭。

[Duji] Sizhong expanded and improved [the structure], using a workforce of 750,000 men.³⁸ [All construction work was performed] by soldiers (*junzu*) [stationed in the] garrisons (*tunshu*). Not a single civilian was forced into labor. The emperor praised the [construction] work (*lao*) and, by imperial order, conferred a reward [onto Duji Sizhong].³⁹

Source 16

Wanyan Xiang makes soldiers and civilians dig moats⁴⁰

Dated: 1198 (承安三年)

因請就用步卒穿壕築障，起臨潢左界北京路以為阻塞。言者多異同，詔問方略。

[Wanyan Xiang] then proposed to employ infantrymen (*buzu*) to dig trenches (*hao*) and build barriers (*zhang*), starting at the left border of Linhuang prefecture in the Northern Capital circuit, which would serve as buffers. Most of the participants in the discussion were against the proposal. The emperor requested an overall plan (*fanglüe*).

襄曰：「今茲之費雖百萬貫，然功一成則邊防固而戍兵可減半，歲省三百萬貫，且寬民轉輸之力，實為永利。」詔可。

[Wanyan] Xiang said: “Although the current expenditure is over one million strings of cash, this work [of the construction] can make the frontier defense (*bianfang*) solid, reduce the number of garrison soldiers (*shubing*) to half of the current size, and annually save three million strings of cash. Additionally, the civilians have much less work in terms of transporting [provisions to the frontier]. Truly, the benefits are everlasting.” The emperor permitted [the construction].

襄親督視之，軍民並役，又募飢民以傭即事，五旬而畢。於是西北、西南路亦治塞如所請。Xiang supervised it [the construction] in person. Both soldiers (*jun*) and civilians (*min*) performed corvée labor (*yi*), and famine-stricken civilians (*jimin*) were employed as well. [The work] was completed in fifty days. As a result, both in the Northwest and Southwest circuits, fortresses (*sai*) were set up as proposed.

³⁸ This number seems extremely high. Perhaps *gong* 工 should not be understood as *gongren* 工人 (worker) but rather in the sense of *gongri* 工日 (manday), a unit of one day's work by one person. The same qualification should be applied to other passages that use *gong* in similar contexts.

³⁹ The same event is related in JS 11.254 where it is dated 1200 instead of 1198 (but NB that Wang Guowei, discussing the two different dates, considers 1198 more likely): “At the end of the ninth month of the fifth year of Cheng'an (1200), the Department of State Affairs memorialized that, according to Northwest circuit Pacification Commissioner Duji Sizhong, each circuit [now had] frontier forts (*bianbao*) as well as walls and trenches (*qiang huang*). [These structures stretch] six hundred *li* from Tanshe in the west to Huliema in the east. They were originally [in the Shizong era] built in a great rush (*congju*) and had no battlements (*nüqiang*) and no secondary line of embankment (*fudi*). Their construction was [only] recently completed. The estimated workforce [was] 750,000 men. Only frontier outpost personnel (*shu*) and members of the regular military (*jun*) were part of the corvée workforce. No attempts were made to mobilize civilians (*min*). The work is now finished. His Highness granted a reward by imperial edict” 承安五年九月己未，尚書省奏西北路招討使獨吉思忠言，各路邊堡牆隍，西自坦舌，東至胡烈麼，幾六百里。向以起築匆遽，並無女牆副堤，近令修完。計工七十五萬，止役戍軍，未嘗動民，今已畢工。上賜詔獎諭。

⁴⁰ JS, 94.2090; *Xiang zhuan* 襄傳 (Biography of [Wanyan] Xiang).

Source 17

Pusan Kui's trenches form a continuous line with beacon towers⁴¹

Dated: 1199 circa⁴²

僕散揆本名臨喜，其先上京人，(...) 升西南路招討使兼天德軍節度使 (...)

The original [given] name of Pusan Kui was Linxi 臨喜. His ancestry was from the Upper Capital. (...)

[Pusan Kui] was promoted to the post of Southwest circuit Pacification Commissioner and, simultaneously, to the post of Military Commissioner of the Tiande Military Commandery 天德軍 (...)

會韓國大長公主薨，揆來赴，上諭之曰：「北邊之事，非卿不能辦。」乃賜戰馬二，即日遣還。

When [his wife] the Princess-Supreme of Hanguo passed away, [Pusan] Kui went to court.⁴³ The emperor told [him] per edict: “Only you are qualified to deal with northern border affairs.” [The emperor] bestowed upon [Pusan Kui] two warhorses and [made him] come back [to the border] that very day.

揆沿徼築壘穿塹，連亙九百里，營柵相望，烽堠相應，人得恣田牧，北邊遂寧；召拜參知政事。Kui built ramparts (*lei*) and dug trenches (*qian*) along the frontier, forming a continuous line of 900 *li*.

Forts (*yingzha*) were in visible distance to each other, and beacon towers (*fenghou*) were in contact with each other. People were [once again] able to engage in agriculture and animal husbandry. Consequently, the northern frontier became peaceful, and [Pusan Kui] was appointed Vice Grand Councilor.

Source 18

A great amount of frontier wall construction is being performed⁴⁴

Dated: 1200

Note: This passage comes from the biography of “Vice Director in the Ministry of Revenue Zhang Wei (n.d.)” (戶部員外郎張煒).

煒出爲同知鎮西軍節度使事，轉同知西京轉運使事。

[Zhang Wei] took up a post as Associate Military Commissioner of the Western Army. He was then moved to the post of Associate Transport Commissioner of the Western Capital.

是時，大築界牆，被行戶工部牒主役事。

At this time, a great amount of frontier wall (*jieqiang*) construction was being performed. [Zhang Wei] was formally ordered by branches of the Ministry of Revenue and Ministry of Works to take charge of this corvée task [of wall-building].

⁴¹ JS, 93.2067–68; *Pusan Kui zhuan* 僕散揆傳 (Biography of Pusan Kui).

⁴² This passage is not dated. Wang Guowei (“Jin jiehao kao,” 718) argues that it can be dated indirectly via another passage from the JS’s Zhangzong section, describing how in 1199 the Southwest circuit Pacification Commissioner Pusan Kui was promoted to the post of Vice Grand Councilor (*canzhi zhengshi* 參知政事). Thus, the above episode should also be dated to 1199, or at least not much earlier.

⁴³ NB that Hanguo 韓國 can hardly refer to Korea here; rather, it seems to be a princely court of the Jin empire.

⁴⁴ JS, 100.2215; *Zhang Wei zhuan* 張煒傳 (Biography of Zhang Wei).

Source 19

Wanyan Zonghao argues for trench-building, against Zhang Wangong⁴⁵

Dated: 1202 circa (known year of Zonghao's promotion and Zhang Wangong's retirement)

宗浩進拜尚書右丞相，時懲北邊不寧，議築壕塹以備守戍，群臣多異同。

When [Wanyan] Zonghao (d. 1207) was ceremonially promoted to Right Grand Councilor of the Department of State Affairs, warnings were issued regarding unrest in the north. [Zonghao] proposed to build trenches (*haoqian*) that would be defended by garrisons (*shu*). Most officials objected.

平章政事張萬公力言其不可；宗浩獨調便。乃命宗浩行省事以督其役。

Manager of Governmental Affairs Zhang Wangong insisted that [these plans] would not work. Only Zonghao said that [their implementation] would be feasible. Thereupon, [the emperor] ordered Zonghao to take these matters into his hands and supervise the work.

IV) Late Jin sources (1209–1234):

Source 20

Building and re-building of Black Desert Fort (Wushabao)⁴⁶

Dated: 1210 and 1211 (fifth and sixth year of the Great Yuan following the YS count)

金謀來伐，築烏沙堡。帝命遮別襲殺其衆，遂略地而東。...

[In the spring of 1210,] the Jin planned a punitive expedition and built Black Desert Fort (Wushabao, today's Xinghe county, Ulanqab, Inner Mongolia). The emperor (Chinggis) ordered Zhebie to attack [Black Desert Fort] and kill its soldiers. [Yuan troops] occupied the territory and moved eastward. ...

二月，帝自將南伐，敗金將定薛於野狐嶺，取大水灤、豐利等縣。金復築烏沙堡。

In the second month [of 1211], the emperor himself led a southern expedition, defeated the Jin general Ding Xue at Wild Fox Ridge (Yehuling), and captured Dashuiluo, Fengli, and other counties. The Jin re-built Black Desert Fort.

秋七月，命遮別攻烏沙堡及烏月營，拔之。

In the seventh month of autumn (of 1211), [Chinggis] ordered Zhebie to attack Black Desert Fort and Black Moon Camp (Wuyueying). [Zhebie] captured [both].

八月，帝及金師戰于宣平之會河川，敗之。九月，拔德興府，居庸關守將遁去。遮別遂入關，抵中都。

In the eight month (of 1211), the emperor (Chinggis) fought the Jin troops at Huihechuan in Xuanping (southwest of Zhangjiakou, Hebei province) and defeated them. In the ninth month, [when Chinggis] captured Daxingfu, the defending military officers of Juyong Pass fled. Thereupon, Zhebie crossed the pass, [finally] arriving at the Central Capital.

⁴⁵ JS, 93.2074; *Zonghao zhuan* 宗浩傳 (Biography of [Wanyan] Zonghao).

⁴⁶ YS, 1.15; *Taizu benji* 太祖本紀 (Basic annals of the Grand Progenitor, i.e. Chinggis Khan).

Source 21

Duji Sizhong and Wanyan Chengyu reinforce Black Desert Fort (Wushabao)⁴⁷

Dated: 1211 (third year of Da'an 大安三年)

與參知政事承裕將兵屯邊，方繕完烏沙堡，思忠等不設備，大元前兵奄至，取烏月營，思忠不能守，乃退兵，思忠坐解職。衛紹王命參知政事承裕行省，既而敗績于會河堡云。

[Duji Sizhong] and Vice Grand Councilor [Wanyan] Chengyu led the soldiers to the frontier and stationed them there. When Sizhong and his men [were preoccupied with] reinforcing Black Desert Fort and were not prepared for defense, the vanguard of the Great Yuan suddenly approached and captured Black Moon Camp. Sizhong was unable to defend it, thus he withdrew his soldiers. As a consequence, Sizhong was dismissed from office. Prince Shao of Wei (i.e., Wanyan Yunji, r. 1208–1213) appointed Vice Grand Councilor [Wanyan] Chengyu as the regional commissioner (*xingsheng*), and before long he [Chengyu] was defeated at Huihebao (i.e., the “Huihechuan” mentioned in source 19).

Source 22

Mongols capture Black Desert Fort; importance of local geographical knowledge⁴⁸

Dated: 1211 (third year of Da'an 大安三年)

Note: The introduction to this passage describes how Wanyan Chengyu and Duji Sizhong were put in charge of “guarding the frontier” (*shubian* 戍邊).

烏沙堡之役不爲備，失利，朝廷獨坐思忠，詔承裕主兵事。八月，大元大兵至野狐嶺，承裕喪氣，不敢拒戰，退至宣平。

Being unprepared, the soldiers at Black Desert Fort were defeated. The [Jin] court only dismissed [Duji] Sizhong (without punishing him) and ordered Chengyu to lead the army. In the eighth month, the Great Yuan army approached Wild Fox Ridge (Yehuling; north of today's Shanfangbao, Wanquan county, Hebei province). Chengyu felt disheartened, did not dare to resist, and withdrew to Xuanping.

縣中土豪請以土兵爲前鋒，以行省兵爲聲援，承裕畏怯不敢用，但問此去宣德間道而已。土豪嗤之曰：“溪澗曲折，我輩諳知之。行省不知用地利力戰，但謀走耳，今敗矣。”

The local leaders of the county proposed to [Chengyu] to employ their local troops at the frontline and to employ higher-level troops for support. Chengyu acted cowardly and did not dare to use [local troops]. He instead only asked about the shortcut to Xuande (present-day Xuanhua county, Zhangjiakou, Hebei province). The local leaders laughed at him and said: “The mountain gorges here are difficult terrain. We know them really well. The regional commissioner does not know how to fight in a determined way by exploiting the advantages of local topography but only thinks about escape—we are doomed this time.”

其夜，承裕率兵南行，大元兵踵擊之。明日，至會河川，承裕兵大潰。承裕僅脫身，走入宣德。大元游兵入居庸關，中都戒嚴。識者謂金之亡決於是役。

That night, when Chengyu led his soldiers southwards, the Great Yuan troops followed them and attacked. The next day, when they approached Huihechuan, Chengyu's troops were put to rout. Chengyu barely escaped to Xuande. When the mobile troops of the Great Yuan entered Juyong Pass, the Central Capital imposed emergency measures. The wise (*shizhe*) say that this battle (*yi*) determined the fall of the Jin.

⁴⁷ JS, 93.2064-65, *Duji Sizhong zhuan*.

⁴⁸ JS, 93.2066; *Wanyan Chengyu zhuan* 完顏承裕傳.

Source 23

Li Zhichang observes Jin-era border fortifications north of Fuzhou⁴⁹

Dated: 1221 (the observation was made in 1221; the travelogue itself was written in 1228)

Note: The bleak remoteness of the Jin wall in the Chinese perception is conveyed in the *Xiyou ji* 西遊記 (not to be confused with the eponymous Ming novel), written by Daoist disciple Li Zhichang 李志常 (1193–1256). Fuzhou had been the headquarters of the Jin's Northwest circuit.

北顧但寒沙衰草，中原之風，自此隔絕矣。

[Ten days after leaving today's Beijing and] gazing north, we saw only cold sands and withered grass. Here marked the end of the sights and customs (*feng*) of the Central Plains (*Zhongyuan*).

Another ten days after crossing these borderlands, the party finally reached the Jin walls which are clearly recognized as such by referring to emperor Zhangzong's Mingchang reign:

北過撫州，十五日，東北過蓋里泊，蓋里泊，盡丘垤咸鹵地，始見人煙二十餘家。南有鹽池，迤邐東北去。自此無河，多鑿沙井以汲。南北數千里，亦無大山，馬行五日，出明昌界。

Proceeding north, we passed through Fuzhou. On the fifteenth day, traveling northeast, we passed Gailipo—a land composed entirely of small mounds and salt fields—where we saw twenty or so homes, our first sign of human habitation. Salt ponds on the south side gradually meandered off to the northeast. From here on there were no rivers, and one had to sink wells in the sand to reach water. For thousands of *li* to the north and south one encounters no mountains of any size either. After a five-day ride we crossed the Mingchang border.

Source 24

Zhao Gong reflects on emperor Zhangzong's "new long-wall"⁵⁰

Dated: 1221

Note: This passage from Zhao Gong's MDBL again confirms the Zhangzong era as a crucial period of wall-building. Note that the structures are referred to as "walls" here, not as "trenches."

章宗又以爲患，乃築新長城，在靜州之北。以唐古紮人戍之。

Zhangzong, who also considered the Tatars a calamity, built a new long-wall (*xin changcheng*) in the north of [the Jin border market] Jingzhou (today's Chengbu Village in Dorbod banner, Ulanqab, Inner Mongolia). Tangut *jiu* people (*Tanggu jiu* 唐古紮) guarded it.⁵¹

⁴⁹ *Changchun Zhenren xiyou ji*, 1.14. Li Zhichang was a disciple of Qiu Chuji 丘處機 (1148–1227) or Master Changchun who, from 1221 to 1224, traveled to meet Chinggis Khan. Translation based on *Daoist Master Changchun's Journey to the West*, 35, with minor revisions.

⁵⁰ MDBL, 6; translation based on Atwood, *Rise of the Mongols*, 84, with minor revisions.

⁵¹ As noted, *jiu* 紮 referred to ethnically mixed armies and/or border-guarding tribes.

V) Sources of the first three decades following the Jin's fall (1235–1265):

Source 25

Zhang Dehui observes Jin-era trenches north of Changzhou⁵²

Dated: 1247

Note: This excerpt is from a travel report by Zhang Dehui 張德輝 (1194–1274) who was born a subject of the Jin empire. After the Jin's demise, he went north to Hebei where Shi Tianze 史天澤 (1202–1275), a key Chinese commander on the Mongol side, employed him as a registrar (*jingli* 經歷). Here he describes his 1247 expedition to Mongolia to welcome Qubilai Khan (r. 1260–1294), observing landscapes and people he encountered during a journey of ten months.

尋過撫州，惟荒城在焉。

Soon we passed Fuzhou [which had been the headquarters of the Jin's Northwest circuit], where only deserted city walls (*huang cheng*) were left.

北入昌州，居民僅百家，中有廨舍，乃國王所建也，亦有倉廩，隸州之鹽司。

[Traveling further] northwards, we entered Changzhou (today's Jiuliancheng 九連城, circa 100 km southwest of Taibus banner, Inner Mongolia). Its residents were barely a hundred families. In its center was a government building which had been built by the Prince of State (*Guowang*, i.e. the Mongol general Muqali, 1170–1223, who served as viceroy in North China). There was also a granary which was subordinate to the prefecture's Salt Office.

州之東有鹽池，周廣可百里，土人謂之狗澱，以其形似故也。

East of the prefecture (i.e., Changzhou) there was a salt lake with a circumference of perhaps one hundred *li*. The local people call it Dog Lake (*Goupo*) due to its [peculiar, dog-like] shape.⁵³

州之北行百餘里。有故壘隱然，連亙山谷。壘南有小廢城，問之居者，曰：‘此前朝所築堡障也’；城有戍者之所居。

[We then] traveled around 100 more *li* northwards from the prefecture. There was an ancient rampart (*gu lei*), quite hidden, and running all the way across (*liangen*) a mountain ravine.⁵⁴ South of the rampart was a small and dilapidated (*fei*) walled settlement (*cheng*). When we asked those who lived there [about the rampart], they said: ‘This is a guard post (*baozhang*) built by the previous dynasty.’ The [dilapidated] settlement [still] has the residences of [its former] border guards.⁵⁵

⁵² Zhang Dehui, *Saibei jixing* 塞北紀行 (Notes on a journey north of the passes, c. 1247); translation based on Atwood, *Rise of the Mongols*, 166, with minor revisions. For an introduction to this source, see Atwood, *Rise of the Mongols*, 163.

⁵³ A “Dog Lake” appears more than once in related sources (see discussion in Wang, “Jin jiehao kao,” 733). Atwood (*Rise of the Mongols*, 166, n.18) identifies this lake as “present-day Jiuliancheng lake (Urtu Nuur in modern Mongolian)..., one of the seven major salt production areas of the Jin dynasty...The shape is very long and narrow.”

⁵⁴ The phrase 連亙山谷 would be crucial if we assume that there is any precision in the geographical description of the rampart. Does the rampart run in parallel to the ravine? Or does it cut across it (perpendicularly)? 連亙 seems to imply that the rampart runs in parallel to the ravine which also makes more sense regarding construction techniques.

⁵⁵ The last seven characters, 城有戍者之所居, could certainly be translated as “the settlement is inhabited by the guards stationed there” (Atwood, *Rise of the Mongols*, 166) but we understand it as expressed above: in this deserted settlement one could still see the residences of its *former* border guards. While the Jin border guards were long gone, their houses were still there, echoing the atmosphere of abandonment and dilapidation invoked by the author.

Source 26

Wang Yun observes trenches north of Huanzhou⁵⁶

Dated: 1261

Note: Written by poet-official Wang Yun 王惲 (1227–1304) one year after Qubilai became Khagan in 1260. Wang Yun traveled in Qubilai's entourage during an expedition to the west.

中統二年三月二十四日乙酉，次桓州故城。……

On the twenty-fourth day of the third month of the second year of Zhongtong (Qubilai Khan, i.e. 1261), [I] stayed over at the old city of Huanzhou [once the Jin pacification commission of Northwest circuit]...

二十七日戊子，次新桓州。西南十里外，南北界壕尚宛然也。距舊桓州三十里。……

On the twenty-seventh day, [I] stayed over at the new [city of] Huanzhou (Silang 四郎 in the north of today's Zhenglan banner, Inner Mongolia). Ten *li* away to the southwest, remnants of frontier trenches (*jiehao*) [dividing] north and south are still clearly visible. [It] is thirty *li* away from old Huanzhou...⁵⁷

二十八日己丑，飯新桓州，未刻，扈從鑾駕入開平府……距離新桓州四十有五里。

On the 28th day, [I] ate at the new Huanzhou. Between 13:00 and 15:00 o'clock, [I rode] in the retinue of the imperial chariot as it entered Kaipingfu (the Yuan-era summer capital Shangdu, i.e. Marco Polo's Xanadu in today's Zhenglan banner, Inner Mongolia)... [which] is 45 *li* away from the new Huanzhou.

⁵⁶ Wang Yun 王惲, *Zhongtang shiji* 中堂事記 (Records from the court), *juan* 80. On the author, see Herbert Franke, "Wang Yün (1227–1304): A Transmitter of Chinese Values," in *Yüan Thought: Chinese Thought and Religion Under the Mongols* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1982), 177–82.

⁵⁷ It is unclear *what* is 30 *li* away from old Huanzhou—either the trenches or new Huanzhou.